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Parody is a form of expression which involves the creation of a new work by using an 
existing work as its basis or platform.
1
 Parody may be humorous, serious or critical, 
depending on the intention of the parodist.
2
In order for a work to be successful as a parody, 
the audience of that new work must be able to recognise the underlying work.
3
Thus by its 
very nature, parody depends on the original work. One of the main reasons why parody is 
important in today’s society is because of the expression that parody allows parodists to make 
and therefore the messages which parody often conveys.
4
 The expression or message 
conveyed may be one that is critical and thus the public are encouraged to look at society 
through a more critical lense,
5
 or it may be merely humorous, thus bringing a sense of fun 
and laughter into society.
6
 Original works are however protected by copyright law.
7
 This law 
seeks to protect a copyrighted work from the unauthorised use of that work by another. This 
is the very reason that parody comes into conflict with copyright law. Owners of original 
works enjoy copyright protection over their works, therefore when parodists use their work 
without their permission, copyright owners may feel that their rights have been infringed. 
This issue is further complicated by the fact that because, parodists often mock or ridicule or 
                                                          
1
Harvard Law Review Publishing Association ‘The Parody Defense To Copyright Infringement: Productive Fair 
Use After Betamax’ (1984) 97 Harvard LR at 1395 available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1340971 (accessed 
on 21 May 2012).See also L Hutcheon A Theory of Parody: The Teachings of Twentieth Century Art Forms 
(1985) 32. 
2
 MA Rose Parody//Meta-fiction: An Analysis of Parody as a Critical Mirror to Writing and Reception of 
Fiction (1979) 17. 
3
Harvard Law Review Publishing Association ‘The Parody Defense To Copyright Infringement’ 1395.  See also 
S Dentith ‘Parody’ (2000) 4:  Dentith point out that parody involves “imitation”. See also R Saha & S 
Mukherjee ‘Not So Funny Now Is It? The Serious Issue of Parody in Intellectual Property Law’ at 1, available 
at http://www.nalsar.ac.in/IJIPL/Files/Archives/Volume%201/4.pdf(accessed on 2 August 2012). 
4
 S16 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,1996 (Constitution). 
5
 As pointed out by G Reynolds ‘Necessarily Critical? : The Adoption of a parody Defence to Copyright 
Infringement in Canada’ at 4, available at http://robsonhall.ca/mlj/images/Articles/33v2/reynolds.pdf (accessed 
on 21 June 2012):  “critical parodies can promote public participation…” 
6
In Laugh It Off Promotions v South African Breweries International (Finance) B.V. t/a Sabmark International 
2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) 109 Sachs J noted that “humour is one of the great solvents of democracy”(herein 
afterthis case isreferred to as the ‘Laugh It Off’ case).   
7
 Copyright Act 98 of 1978. 
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make fun of the original work, copyright owners are seldom likely to give consent for their 
original work to be parodied.   
The issue of parody has not been extensively examined in South Africa.  The only time it has 
been discussed is in the case of Laugh It Off  Promotions v South African Breweries 
International (Finance) B.V. t/a Sabmark International 
8
 where  Sachs J, in a separate 
judgment points towards the dangers of living in a society that takes itself too seriously’.
9
  
Here the learned judge encourages society to let go of its seriousness and laugh.
10
 The judge 
however does not ignore the problem that this laughter may bring with it a conflict between 
the parodist’s expression and the interests of the original author of the concerned work.
11
 
Unlike in South Africa, other jurisdictions such as the United States of America, Canada and 
the United Kingdom have had many opportunities to determine the issue of parody within the 
copyright regime. This dissertation accordingly critically analyses foreign case law and 
principles in order to determine whether South Africa may learn any lessons from the issues 
which they have grappled with. 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to consider parody in light of the law of copyright, to 
determine how the two interact and conflict, and finally, to make recommendations for a way 
going forward for South Africa. The three main issues that this paper seeks to address are the 
following: 
 Whether parody has a value in society and if so should it be granted protection within 
the law,  
 How parody conflicts with copyright,  and  
 Whether it is possible for copyright law to adequately accommodate parody as the 
law stands currently and if not, whether the existing copyright law can and should be 
amended in order to accommodate parody. 
                                                          
8
2006 (1) SA 144 (CC). 
9
The main judgment by Moseneke J focused on the issue of trademark infringement and dilution, however Sachs 
J wrote a separate judgment in which he dealt with the issue of parody. 
10





This dissertation will commence with a brief analysis on what is parody and a discussion of 
the purpose that it serves in society. In order to capture how parody conflicts with an author’s 
copyright I will also give a brief description of copyright and will thereafter examine the law 
on the issue of parody in the three different jurisdictions that I have mentioned above. This 
will be necessary in order to ascertain whether there are any lessons to be learnt from these 
jurisdictions. I will discuss how parodies are currently treated in South Africa and will 
conclude with certain recommendations regarding how parodies should be treated together 
with making some recommendations regarding amendments to the law. 
2. UNDERSTANDING PARODY 
 2.1 A short history 
The term parody has been in existence for centuries.
12
 The word parody (parodia) was used 
by Aristotle to mean “a narrative poem of modern length in the metre and vocabulary of epic 
poems; but treating a light; satirical, or mock-heroic subject”.
13
From this description, it 
appears that parody was used specifically for subject matters which were not regarded as 
serious, in order to poke fun at certain issues. The meaning of parody has however evolved 
from this early description and has developed as an art form. Over time there have been many 
different definitions. Hutcheon states that parody can have a narrow meaning, such as the use 
of another’s work for the intent of mocking (the meaning given by Aristotle), and it can have 
a broader meaning; that is the parodist can aim to do something other than to ridicule. For 
example, the parodist can aim to “recontexualize” a work or repeat it with a completely 
different and novel meaning.
14
 Rose considers the various ways in which parody has been 
defined and concludes that “it is due to [its] long history that the meaning of the term has 
become the subject of so much argument”.
15
 
                                                          
12
  Hutcheon A Theory of Parody 1. See also Rose Parody//Meta-fiction 18.  
13
  Dentith Parody 10. 
14
  Hutcheon A Theory of Parody 32. 
15
 Rose Parody//Meta-fiction 17-18: Rose notes that parody has been defined according to its etymology, its 
usage in comedy, the attitude of the parodist to the work parodied or to the reader, the effect of the parody on 




Despite these different definitions, it is not easy to ascertain exactly what parody is. 
According to Dentith,
16
 parody describes “a related group of forms that all intervene in 
different ways in the dialogues, conversations and dissentions that make up human 
discourse”. Dentith goes further to submit that there can never be a settled meaning of parody 
because parody is widely used by a vast number of persons in a variety of ways.
17
 Hutcheon 




 2.2 The modern definition of parody 
From the above, it is evident that there is no single conception of parody. Since a complete 
evaluation of all the conceptions of parody is beyond the scope of this paper, this discussion 
will be limited to three modern concepts of parody, namely target parody, weapon parody and 
comic parody. 
2.2.1 Target parody 
Target parody is a type of parody that targets the original work itself.
19
 Kennedy J stated that 
parody “must target the original”; it cannot merely target the society as a whole, or the 
general style of the author, although it may target these alongside the original work.
20
An 
example of such a parody can be found in the case of Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, Inc 510 
US 569 (1994) where the court had to deal with  a parody of a song written by Roy Orbison 
and William Dee.
21
In this case, the court was of the opinion that the parody concerned 




                                                          
16
  Dentith Parody preface. 
17
  Dentith Parody 6. 
18
  Hutcheon A Theory of Parody 52. 
19
Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, Inc 510 US 569 (1994) 597:.Note that the court considered target parody to be 
protectable under fair dealing because the target on the original work by the parodist, was seen to demand 
borrowing from the original. 
20
Ibid 597.    
21
Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, Inc 510 US 569 (1994) (herein after this case is referred to as the ‘Campbell’ 
case) this case is discussed in more detail below in 5.1.3.1. 
22
Campbell (note 20 above) 582: This is demonstrated where Souter J quotes Judge Nelson stating that the 2 
Live Crew members sing the song “with no hint of wine and roses”.   
9 
 
2.2.2 Weapon parody 
Weapon parody refers to parodies that use the original work as a platform to comment on 
something other than the original work itself.
23
 Weapon parody is therefore different to target 
parody as it does not comment on the original work. An example of such a parody can be 
found in T. S Eliot’s The Waste Land
24
 a poem which according to Posner uses the works of 
various famous authors, such as Shakespeare, in order to criticise the “sordidness and 
spiritual emptiness of modern life”.
25
 
In Campbell, the court considered weapon parody to be equivalent to satire.
26
. The court 
described satire as a work “in which prevalent follies or vices are assailed with 
ridicule”.
27
Satire, unlike parody is aimed at commenting on anything other than the original 
work
28
 and the court in Campbell stated that if a secondary work does not comment on the 
original then the claim to fair use “diminishes accordingly”.
29
The court reasoned that this is 
because satire does not require the use of another’s work as it “can stand on its own two 
feet”.
30
The difficulty with weapon parody and its connection to satire is that the courts have 
in the past only accepted target parody as being entitled to copyright exemption under the 
defence of fair use.
31
However it seems that the distinction between weapon and target parody 
                                                          
23
Ibid 581. See also A Spies ‘Revering Irreverence: A Fair Dealing Exception for Both Weapon And Target 
Parodies’ (2011) 34 UN SW LJ 1122, 1122: weapon parodies are often referred to as ‘satire’ in the United 
States. 
24
T.S .Eliot ‘The Waste land New York: Horace Liver light’ at 1922, available at www.bartleby.com/201/1.html 
(accessed on 21 December 2012). 
25
  RA Posner ‘When Is Parody Fair Use?’ (1992) 21 The Journal of Legal Studies 67, 71. 
26
 Spies ‘Revering Irreverence’ (2011) UN SW LJ 1122.  
27
  Campbell (note 20 above) 581: The court quotes this definition from the Oxford English Dictionary at 500 
(2ed 1989). 
28
Dr. Seuss enterprises, L.P., v. Penguin books USA, Inc.109 F.3d 1394(9
th
 Cir. 1997) 1400: satire uses 
copyrighted work only as “...a vehicle to poke fun at another target”. 
29
Campbell (note 20 above) 580. 
30
 Ibid 581. Ultimately, the court only considered target parody to be exempt under fair use. 
31
The defence of fair use will be discussed in 3.6.1 below. 
10 
 




From the above descriptions it seems that both weapon and target parodies are used in 
instances where the parodist wishes to comment or criticize. It shall later become evident that 
the use of parody for purposes of ‘comment and criticism’
33
 does not pose a problem for 
parodists, and that these two types of parody can be accommodated within existing copyright 
law rules.
34
However, despite this, there still appears to be a problem with weapon parody 
because although the parodist is seeking to criticise or make a comment on society, he or she 
is using a protected work where there is no need to do so.
35
Nonetheless, it may be that 
protecting weapon parody against a claim of copyright infringement is easier to argue 
because it involves the making of a social comment, which is protected under copyright 
exceptions. This will be discussed further below. The making of a social comment 
distinguishes weapon parody from comic parody which creates problems when it comes to 
convincing courts that the parodist is deserving of protection.  
   2.2.3 Comic parody 
It has been recognized that parody does not have to criticize its underlying work but instead a 
work may be used for a completely different purpose.
36
 Comic parody has been identified by 
Rose as being a “specific parody (having a) comic function”.
37
 The definition of parody 
through this function has caused some to assume that parody is only limited to this function.
38
 
                                                          
32
 Spies ‘Revering Irreverence’ (2011) UN SW LJ 1122. For criticism of this see Posner ‘When Is Parody Fair 
Use?’ (1992) The Journal of Legal Studies 67. Posner argues that the parody defence should not be expanded to 
cases where a parody criticizes something other than the original work. 
33
Note that s12 (1) of the South African Copyright Act 98 of 1978 refers to the purpose of ‘criticism’ only, 
whilst s107 of the American Copyright Act 1976 refers to both ‘comment and criticism’. This is discussed in 
more detail below. 
34
This is because copyright law has an exception for infringement in such instances. For example see 12(1) of 
the South African Copyright of 1978 which deals with fair dealing for the purpose of criticism and s107 of the 
American Copyright Act 1976 which deals withfair use for the purposes of criticism and comment. 
35
Campbell (note 20 above) 581: the court noted that because satire (or weapon parody) does not make a 
comment in relation to the original work, it “requires justification for the very act of borrowing”. 
36
 Rose Parody//Meta-fiction 34. 
37
 Rose Parody//Meta-fiction 17-19. 
38
  Rose Parody//Meta-fiction 21.See also Hutcheon A Theory of Parody 52 where he aargues that parody has 
other functions besides that of its comic function, for example irony. 
11 
 
Comic parody, which may be characterized by its intention to make fun of or ridicule, 
therefore differs from target and weapon parody which does not seek as its ultimate aim, to 
be humorous. 
 This type of parody is particularly relevant for comedians who create parodies with the 
intention of making people laugh and for no other real purpose such as criticism or 
commenting on society. An example of such a parodist is the well-known South African 
comedian Trevor Noah. Given the present state of South African copyright law it seems that 
comedy parodist do not enjoy protection from the law, and may well be exposed to claims of 
copyright infringement. Currently in South Africa, comedians have no defence to copyright 
infringement actions against them, unless they can argue that the work was parodied for 
criticism or comment. Therefore if a parody only projects pure humour as opposed to any 
criticism and comment, the parodist is probably unprotected and in all probability the parodist 
will be committing an act of copyright infringement.
39
 
2.3 Why parody is important 
Before it can be argued that parodists are entitled to protection from an accusation of 
copyright infringement it is necessary to evaluate the benefits of parody for society. It is also 
necessary to consider the criticisms of parody in order to evaluate whether these criticisms 
outweigh the benefits and therefore a defence of parody should not be allowed in law. It is 
suggested that there are two main benefits to parody namely: parody’s political role and 
parody’s role in entertainment. 
2.3.1 Parody’s political role 




 parodies can be seen as promoting 
the constitutional right of freedom of expression.
42
 
Dworkin identifies two justifications for the importance of free speech, one being that 
allowing people to say what they want to say “will produce good effects for the rest of us”
43
. 
                                                          
39
The word ‘probably’ is used here because there have been no decided cases in South Africa however, given 
the state of copyright law at present, it is highly likely that should a comic parodist be accused of copyright 
infringement he or she will be unlikely to have a defence. 
40




 Reynolds ‘Necessarily Critical?’ 4. 
12 
 
Dworkin draws from Holmes, who justified freedom of speech by saying that if political 
debate is uncensored then politics is “more likely to discover truth and eliminate error or to 
produce good rather than bad policies”.
44
 The other justification given by Dworkin for 
freedom of speech is that it is valuable because it is an important and “constitutive feature of 
a just political society that government treat all its adult members, except those who are 
incompetent, as responsible moral agents”.
45
 This second justification means that the 
government must trust and respect its people enough to allow them to express their opinions 
and to hear the opinions of others.
46
 
Deazley states that parody has a meaningful role in promoting the right of freedom of speech 
and therefore argues that parody should be “meaningfully and unambiguously accommodated 
within the copyright regime”.
47
Furthermore, it is argued that denying parody a place within 




In its political role, critical parody may be used to ridicule politicians, political parties and 
even speeches delivered by politicians, whilst exposing the faults in their statements, views or 
ideas.
49
 In doing so, parodies give citizens the opportunity to critically evaluate politics, 
politicians and their understanding of political matters, and also to assess whether they agree 
or disagree with the issues, views and policies of the government.
50
 Critical and non-critical 
parodies may also encourage and motivate “public participation in the democratic process” 
by bringing the ideas or views of the parodist to the attention of the public.
51
When important 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
43






Ibid. Dworkin describes his position as follows: “We retain our dignity, as individuals, only by insisting that 
no one…has the right to withhold an opinion from us on the ground that we are not fit to hear and consider it.” 
Also see generally T Woker Advertising Law (1999) Ch 14 on the importance of freedom of expression in the 
new democracy. 
47












issues are presented in a humorous manner, people may be far more inclined to listen and 
engage, thereby encouraging people to participate in political debate.
52
 
2.3.2 Parody as entertainment 
Parody can simply be pure entertainment and can encourage the production of new 
works.
53
According to Bollier, many great works are those of authors and artists who take 
from prior existing works.
54
 Parody by nature builds on what already exists; therefore if 
parodists put enough labour and skill into their works, irrespective of their works being based 
on prior existing works, they contribute to the growth of creative works.
55
 
Deazley also argues that parody allows for the creation of new art forms in that “as a cultural 
practice [it] can contribute to the evolution and development of literary styles, genres and 
tastes”.
56
 Similarly, Rose states that parody has “transformed literary history” by taking 
original works and continuing to transform them so that its function differs every 
time.
57
Dentith summarizes this view by stating that “all utterances are part of a chain”.
58
By 
this, Dentith is referring to the chain of creativity; meaning that all creative works are linked 
to one another as they appropriate from previous creative works to make new ones. 
There appears to be consensus amongst scholars that are in favour of recognising the role of 
parody in society that it increases creativity and entertainment. A study of their works reveals 
that they are of the view that parody has a vital role to play in contributing to the 
entertainment industry and in stimulating creativity.  
                                                          
52
 As pointed out by Reynolds ‘Necessarily Critical’ 4, parody can bring certain “ideas to the broader section of 
the population”. 
53
 Deazley ‘Copyright and Parody’ (2010) The Modern LR 802. See also Rose Parody//Meta-fiction 158: Rose 
notes that parody has the potential to add something new to its underlying work. 
54
  D Bollier Brand Name Bullies (2005) Ch 3. 
55
Bollier Brand Name Bullies60-61: In the chapter entitled  ‘Vaudeville Comedy: Appropriation is the seed of 
originality’, Bollier argues that many artists initially use existing works prior to coming up with works of their 
own. 
56
 Deazley ‘Copyright and Parody’ (2010) The Modern LR 803. 
57
 Rose Parody//Meta-fiction 158. 
58
 Dentith Parody 3. 
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The Laugh It Off case is a Constitutional Court decision and can, in my view, be regarded as 
the leading South African case concerning parody.  This is said because of the judgement of 
Sachs J.  In this judgement he recognises that entertainment is one of the goals of parody. 
Briefly the facts are as follows: South African Breweries (SAB) sued Justin Nurse from 
Laugh it off Enterprises for making and selling t-shirts with an altered form of a trademark 
which appeared on its Black Label beer. Nurse used the same colour and design of the SAB 
trademark except that he wrote “Black labour white guilt” where there should have been the 
words “Black Label” as well as certain other alterations. The High Court was of the opinion 
that the altered mark constituted hate speech
59
 and Supreme Court of Appeal was of the 
opinion that the message of the mark was “unwholesome, unsavoury or 
degrading”.
60
However the Constitutional Court found otherwise. For the purposes of this 
paper, it is not necessary to discuss the entire decision and the judgment of the majority as the 
majority did not deal with parody and found for Nurse on other grounds. As stated above, and 
for the purposes of this paper, the most relevant comments in the Constitutional Court are 
those of Sachs J who dealt specifically with parody and who was ultimately of the view that 
there is a need to provide latitude for parody, and freedom of expression. This decision is 
important as it highlights the role of parody in society. 
Sachs J describes parody as something that is “paradoxical”. This is because it is both 
creative and derivative at the same time.
61
 The judge points out that the success of parody 
depends on the ability of the audience to recognize the underlying work.
62
 Sachs J also 
distinguishes a plagiarist from a parodist and points out that a plagiarist’s intention is to 
deceive the audience into thinking that he or she is the original author of the work, whilst the 
parodist needs the audience to recognize that the source of his work is not his or her own.
63
 
Of significance, Sachs J lists various motivations for a parodist’s work, namely, to 
“entertain”, to make “social commentary” and for “duplicitous commercial aspirations”.
64
 
                                                          
59
Laugh It Off (note 6 above) 15. 
60
 Ibid 21. 
61
 Ibid 77. 
62







Comic parodies, as discussed above, are a form of entertainment .Thus, the lack of a defence 
of parody means that the people who entertain in this manner are not free to produce their 
comedies in a way that they wish to, for fear of possible claims of infringement by copyright 
owners. This is problematic as it inevitably curtails the quality of work produced by 
comedians, therefore affecting the quality of entertainment that the public receives.
65
 
Accordingly, only the copyright holder benefit’s from the lack of a defence of parody.  
2.4 Criticisms of recognising parody 
Whilst there are some important benefits to the art of parody (as discussed above), there are 
also some criticisms against introducing a defence of parody. These criticisms are closely 
linked to the conflict between copyright law and parody. For this reason, a discussion of the 
criticisms is essential for an understanding of the tensions that exist between the rights of the 
parodist and the rights of the copyright owner. The introduction of a defence of parody has 
been criticised for the following reasons: 
 It would discourage demands for the original work.66When a parodist criticises an 
underlying work it could make it appear less attractive to the audience.
67
 
 It may open up the ‘floodgates’ to people who try to wrongly justify the taking of 
copyrighted work, and therefore cause  the opportunities for abuse to 
increase.68Determining when an original work is being used in a legitimate or 
illegitimate manner may be confusing and thus the distinction between the legitimate 
and illegitimate use of parody would end up ‘blurred’.69 
 It would not be useful to introduce a specific defence of parody because parodists 
often do not have the financial means to go to the courts for a declaration or 
determination of their rights.70 
                                                          
65
 Saha & Mukherjee ‘Not So Funny Now Is It’ 9. 
66




Taking Forward the Gower’s Review of Intellectual Property: Second Stage Consultation on Copyright 
Exceptions (Intellectual Property Office, 2009) at 43, available athttp://www.ipo.gov.uk/consult-gowers2.pdf 




Taking Forward the Gower’s Review of Intellectual Property: Second Stage Consultation 44. 
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 It could potentially infringe on the moral rights of the author.71 Moral rights allow for 
the original author to “object to derogatory treatment” of his or her work.72As 
mentioned above, a critical parody could have negative effects on the original work, 
which in turn could affect the moral rights of the author. 
 Parody has also been criticised as being an “enemy of creativity”.73 As it has been 
mentioned above, parody requires the use of an original work in order to come into 
existence. Therefore because a parody cannot be a wholly creative work,  it can be 




 Finally, one of the reasons why the UK Intellectual Property Office rejected a 
recommendation for the introduction of a specific defence of parody is because the 
fact that there had been no parody defence had never caused concern or problems in 
the past.75 
2.5 A critical evaluation of the criticisms of parody 
As discussed above, the introduction of a defence of parody has been criticised for numerous 
reasons, however, it is important to critically evaluate whether these criticisms are so valid 
that they outweigh the benefit of having a specific defence. Deazley has dealt with each of 
these criticisms and he points out the following: 
 Firstly, Deazley argues that parodies that are “critical or unflattering” also have the 
ability to increase the demand for the original work through exposure.76 
 Secondly, Deazley admits that it is not easy to determine the difference between a 
legitimate use and an illegitimate use. Nonetheless, the difficulty in drawing a 
distinction between the legitimate and illegitimate use of parody is not a justification 




 See 3.7 below for a discussion of moral rights.  
73
  Hutcheon  A Theory of Parody 3. 
74
 In Campbell (note 20 above) 598, Kennedy J states that fair use should not be extended to “profiteers who do 
no more than add a few silly words to someone else’s song…” 
75
Taking Forward the Gower’s Review of Intellectual Property: Second Stage Consultation 44. 
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for the denial of an introduction of a defence of parody as difficult decision making is 
part of the judicial responsibilities.77 
 Thirdly, Deazley argues that the lack of financial means is not a fitting consideration 
when determining whether a parody defence should be introduced. This consideration 
is irrelevant as what is at issue is “the substance of the copyright regime” not the 
“operation of the civil justice system”.78 Therefore, it does not make sense to consider 
that some individuals would be unable to afford to go to court, when considering a 
substantial copyright law issue such as parody.  
 Fourthly, Deazley argues that the rules concerning moral rights should accommodate 
parody because moral rights should not be used by authors of underlying works as a 
“shield” against the negative or critical effects of parody.79 
 Fifthly, Deazley argues that although parody is not a completely novel creation, 
however it is a “form of continuity” in that in builds onto past works so as to bring 
these works to the attention of the public,80 whilst creating something new. In this 
way, parody is a form of creativity in itself. 
 Lastly, Deazley states that the claim that parody has not caused any problems in the 
past should be determined not by the number of parody cases which have come to 
court but by the reasons why people choose not to litigate.81 This is an important 
consideration as a general claim that parody has not posed as a problem in the past 
cannot be made without looking at all the relevant factors such as the cost and 
uncertainty that comes with litigation of such matters. Smaller firms or individuals 
lack the adequate financial means to litigate.82 Also some rights holders are indifferent 
to parody and therefore do not litigate against it, whilst some rights holders are of the 
misconception that parody is not an infringement of copyright law.83 These are all 
discouraging factors towards litigation. Deazley concludes this observation by stating 
that “complacency should not determine copyright policy”.84Therefore, just because 
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there seems to have been no complaints or issues with parody in copyright law, this 
does not mean we should not cater for the possible issues that can arise in this respect.  
2.6 Concluding remarks regarding parody 
From the discussion above, it is clear that there is no single conception of parody. However 
three modern conceptions of the term have been identified, that is weapon, target and comic 
parody. As will be discussed later, weapon and target parody are capable of protection under 
the fair use doctrine as criticism and/or comment, but comic parody is not. Comic parody is 
particularly relevant for comedians whose sole aim in creating a parody is to make their 
audience laugh. It is submitted that in recognizing comic parody as a form of parody, the 
issue of its protection (and of the protection of parody in general) must be analysed. It has 
been submitted that parody is founded on the right to freedom of expression which is a 
constitutional right of all persons and therefore parody deserves protection as a valid form of 
expression. Various benefits of parody have been recognized, including the role parody plays 
in politics, in entertainment and in the society in general. However parody has also been 
criticized for various reasons, one being that it is overly reliant on an innovative work and 
therefore it is harmful to creativity.
85
 
Hutcheon argues that parody needs people to defend it against attack
86
 and therefore despite 
the criticisms’ against a defence of parody, the positive impacts of parody in society should 
not be forgotten or ignored. By the same token, the constitutional right to free expression 
should not be undervalued. 
Having established that parody does have a positive role to play in society, it is now 
necessary to examine why there might be problems with parody from a legal perspective.  
The law which may conflict with parody is copyright law and so this law will now be 
examined. 
3. THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 
 
As mentioned above, parody has the potential to come into conflict with copyright law. 
Copyright protection accrues to copyright holders, and if parodists use copyrighted works, 
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there could be some conflicts. Hence the law of copyright and how parody comes into 
conflict with the rights to the copyright holder needs to be carefully considered. 
 
3.1 An explanation of copyright  
 Copyright in general terms, means the rights granted for the protection of various types of 
works that come into existence as a result of an author’s intellectual creativity.
87
 Copyright is 
essentially concerned with the “negative right of preventing the copying of physical 
material”.
88
 Klopper states that copyright is not just about copying, but it also includes “the 
right to publish, perform, adapt, translate, and transmit work”.
89
 For the purposes of this 
dissertation, however, copyright is simply about giving a person who has created a new work 
a limited monopoly over that work. Because the law protects copyright, creators can prevent 
other people from making use of their work without their permission. 
 In order to keep up with the technological growth, copyright law has been extended in its 
scope from initially being concerned with literature and the arts to now giving protection to 
other fields such as “literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, sound recordings, films, 
broadcasts, cable programmes and the typographical arrangements of published editions”.
90
  
Copyright developed as a result of the development of printing in the 15
th
century. At this 
stage the aim of copyright was to protect the printer and not the author.
91
 However, the 
British Act of 1710 changed this by being the first law to consider the right of the authors 
themselves to control the printing of their works.
92
 Thereafter, the United States of America 
(USA) adopted this system in its first Copyright Act of 1790. Then both jurisdictions began 
to extend the rights of authors in various ways by, for example, including protection for 
authors to perform their works in public.
93
 The British system forms the foundation of 
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copyright law in the Commonwealth, but USA copyright law has diverged from British 
copyright law in some aspects.
94
 
Klopper summarises the unique characteristics of copyright as follows: 
 It grants exclusive negative rights to authors; 
 It protects the material expression of ideas and not the ideas in themselves; 
 Protection is for a limited period of time, 
 Protection is subject to some exceptions and limitations.95 
 
3.2 Why copyright is protected. 
The purpose of copyright is to grant rights of control to creators.
96
 These rights allow a 
creator to control how his or her work may be used.
97
The right to control is referred to as an 
exclusive right (monopoly).  By granting an exclusive right to an author, the author is 
encouraged to create new works and this results in more creativity.
98
 Copyright can thus be 
said to be an incentive that is designed to drive creativity.
99
 
Copyright law protects copyrighted work from being used by the public without authorization 
of the copyright owner. Obtaining authorization however is a hurdle in itself.
100
 The 
authorization process is problematic and research, scientific progress and overall creativity 
can be badly affected where authorization cannot be obtained in time or where the copyright 
owner refuses authorization.
101
Obtaining authorisation also means that one has to know who 
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the copyright owner is
102
 and that the copyright owner is contactable. From this it can be seen 
that obtaining authorization is not always possible. 
Copyright law does not only seek to protect copyright owners. Certain copyrighted works 
have such great value in society that monopoly rights in the work may be detrimental to the 
larger public good. For example, schools and universities require academic works to further 
education and research and tight copyright controls over such works make it difficult to 
achieve this goal.
103
 This is the reason why the law of copyright tries to create a balance 
between the rights of the copyright owner and the public interest. The law of copyright has 
thus been described as, “one balancing trick”.
104
 Groves quotes from Landes and Posner and 
points out that, “Striking the correct balance between access and incentives is the central 
problem in copyright law”.
105
 Copyright law recognizes the need to achieve this balance and 
provides three main ways to achieve such a balance. Firstly; copyright law grants copyright 
owners a limited monopoly, that is, after a certain period of time the work falls into the public 
domain. Secondly, copyright does not protect ideas; it only protects the material expression 
of those ideas. This means that the public is allowed to make use of the ideas behind a work. 
Thirdly; and the law makes provision for certain defences, the most important one being, for 
the purpose of this paper, the right to make fair use of a copyright work.
106
 The question 
which this paper seeks to answer is whether copyright law, as it presently exists, 
accommodates parody as a defence and if not, whether it should accommodate parody and 
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Each of these mechanisms will be discussed in more detail below. 
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3.3 Works eligible for copyright protection 
The Act contains a list of works which are eligible for copyright protection.  Therefore before 
an author can claim copyright protection he or she must show that his or her work falls within 
the ambit of the Act.
107
These are as follows: 
 Literary works;108 
 Musical works;109 
 Artistic works;110 
 Cinematograph films;111 
 Sound recordings;112 
 Broadcasts;113 
 Programme –carrying signals;114 
 Published editions;115 
 Computer programs116 
From this it can be seen that virtually any work which could be the subject of a parody is 
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.However, certain requirements have to be met for a work to 
qualify for copyright protection. These requirements will be discussed below. 
3.4 Requirements for copyright protection 
The requirements for copyright protection are as follows: 
 The work must be original;122 
 The work must be in material form;123 
 The author must be a qualified person124  or the manufacture of the work must have 
taken place in South Africa.
125
 
Although one of the requirements for copyright to exist is that the work must be original, the 
word originality has a special meaning in copyright law. In copyright law “originality refers 
to original skill and labour in execution, not to original thought or expression of thought”.
126
 
Therefore creativity in the form of a completely new work is not a requirement for 
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 The requirement of originality therefore simply requires that the work emanate 
from the author, not that the work needs to be a new thought or expression.
128 
The final point to note is that copyright need not be registered. Copyright is conferred 
automatically upon works mentioned in s2 once the abovementioned requirements have been 
met. From all of this it can be seen, that most works (as discussed in 3.3 above ) are likely to 
be protected by copyright and as already pointed out most works on which the parodist will 
rely for his or her art, will be protected by copyright.  Hence it is highly likely that the 
parodist will at some time or other face a claim of copyright infringement.   
3.5 Copyright infringement 
When parodists use original works that are protected by copyright, there is a possibility that 
they may trample on the exclusive rights of copyright holders. This situation brings the rights 
of parodists and the rights of copyright owners into conflict. The cases have demonstrated, as 
it will be seen later, that this conflict is the cause for litigation on grounds of copyright 
infringement in cases of parody. The object of this section therefore is to give a brief analysis 
of when copyright infringement will occur and what constitutes such infringement. 
Copyright owners have certain exclusive rights in their work, and when someone who is not a 
copyright owner and who has not obtained the requisite permission from the copyright owner, 
does anything that only the copyright owner is allowed to do, then that person is committing 
an act of infringement against the copyright owner.
129
In very simple terms, infringement of 
copyright is concerned with the unauthorised copying of another’s work. However it is not 
just any amount of unauthorised copying that will result in infringement of copyright; the 
copying must be substantial. The rule that a substantial part of the work must be copied stems 
from the common law maxim that the law does not concern itself with trivialities.
130
As 
discussed above, a parodists has to bring the original work to the audience’s attention, in 
doing so, a parodist needs to use a sufficient amount of the original work for the audience to 
be able to recognise it. Due to the fact that many cases of parody involve taking substantial 
parts of the underlying work in order to invoke the audience to recognise a parody, the issue 
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of copyright infringement is most likely to arise. Therefore the substantial taking of an 
original work for purposes of parody can be seen as a form of copyright infringement. 
3.6 Defences 
As stated above it is a very important principle of copyright law that there needs to be a 
balance between the rights of the copyright owner and the public.  For this reason certain 
defences to copyright infringement are built into copyright law thus allowing other persons to 
make use of a copyright work without first obtaining the permission of the owner. The most 
important defence to copyright infringement is the right to make fair use of a work.  
3.6.1 Fair use 





 and the Agreement on the Trade Related Aspect of Intellectual 
Property (TRIPS)
132
 gives guidance as to how the defences for copyright infringement should 
be formulated by the member countries.
133
 This guidance is given in the form of a standard 
three-step test which is designed to limit the monopoly granted to copyright owners. The 
three-step test was first applied under Article 9 (2) of the Berne Convention and it was then 
later adopted in the TRIPS agreement.
134
 For purposes of this dissertation the most relevant 
version of the three-step test is set out in TRIPS. This test allows countries to formulate their 
own defence to copyright infringement provided that three conditions are met: “it must be 
limited to specific cases; it must not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work; and it 
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must not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author”.
135
Countries which are 
signatories to the TRIPS agreement may apply the three step test in any manner provided 
these three conditions are met.
136
 However, according to Dutfield and Suthersanen different 
countries should ensure that when they apply the three step test, they do so in a manner that is 
consistent with their individual economic and social circumstances.
137
The defences created 
by each country must therefore be tailored in accordance with the varying needs of each 
country. Various countries have built the three-step test into their domestic laws in the form 
of fair dealing and fair use.
138
 
The concepts of fair use and fair dealing are relatively similar concepts except that fair 
dealing is limited to a specified list of when unauthorised use of a particular work may occur, 
whereas the fair use defence is more general in nature.
139
 The USA (discussed further below) 




3.6.2 The idea expression dichotomy  
 
The idea/expression dichotomy is not a defence per se in the Copyright Act, however it will 
be discussed here as it is a major principle of copyright law.  The basic principle is that it is 
not the idea or fact which is protected but it is the manner in which the idea or fact is 
expressed that is protected.
141
This means that someone is entitled to use another person’s idea 
or fact, without infringing someone else’s copyright, provided that they express it in their 
own way. For example in Baigent and Leigh v Random House Group Ltd,
142
 a case where the 
authors of the book The Holy Blood and The Holy Grail brought a copyright infringement 
action against the publishers of the book Di Vinci Code, claiming that the author, Dan Brown, 
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of the Da Vinci Code had copied substantial parts of their book.  In deciding that there had 
been no copyright infringement, the court stated that facts and ideas were not protectable, 
only the material expression of those facts and ideas. Therefore, Dan Brown was entitled to 
use certain facts in his fictional book, which had first been presented by the authors of Holy 
Blood. A similar situation arose in the South African case of Galago Publishers (Pty) Ltd v 
Erasmus. 
143
 However, in this case, the court found that the author of the secondary work had 
used more than just the general idea of the original work and has also used the material 
expression found in the first work.  Therefore the Appellate Division (as it then was) found 
that there was copyright infringement. 
 
3.7 Moral rights of the copyright owner 
 
Moral rights are rights which belong to the author of copyrighted work even if the author no 
longer owns the copyright.
144
 These rights confer upon the author the protection of his or her 
“honour or reputation” and they allow the author to claim “authorship” over his or her 
work.
145
 Moral rights belong with the author of the work and may not be transferred, even if 
the copyright owner transfers their copyright to someone else.
146
 These rights therefore lie 





Moral rights are composed of two rights, namely “paternity rights” and “integrity rights”.
148
 
Paternity rights allow the author to claim that he or she is the author of a works.
149
Integrity 
rights on the other hand, are the “right to object to any distortion, mutilation or other 
modification of the work where such action is or would be prejudicial to the honour or 
                                                          
143
1989 (1) SA 276 the AD. 
144




 Ramsden  A Guide to Intellectual Property Law 49. See also Dean Handbook Of South African Copyright 
Law 1-110. 
147
 Dean Handbook Of South African Copyright Law 1-110. 
148
 Ibid. See also Klopper Law of Intellectual Property in South Africa 191. 
149
 Dean Handbook Of South African Copyright Law 1-110. See also Klopper  Law of Intellectual Property in 
South Africa 191. 
28 
 
reputation of the author”.
150
 Together, the paternity right and the integrity right, result in 
moral rights. 
 
 Moral rights are separate, yet they are complementary to copyright in a person’s work.
151
 .It 
is therefore possible that a situation could arise where there is a simultaneous claim of 
copyright infringement and moral rights infringement.
152
 Dean illustrates this situation by 
giving an example where work is substantially reproduced without permission of copyright 
holder, and that work is claimed to be the work of another person.
153
 In this situation, Dean 
notes that there is both an infringement of copyright and infringement of paternity rights. On 
the other hand there are also situations that could arise where there would be no copyright 
infringement, but there would be an infringement of the moral rights of an author.
154
 An 
example of this could be in a situation where an adaptation of the work is done with the 
copyright holder’s permission, but the modifications made are harmful to the honour and 
reputation of the author.
155
 In this case, there would be no copyright infringement since the 
approval of the copyright holder would have been obtained; however a claim for moral rights 
infringement could be made, under the violation of integrity rights.  
 
The term of moral rights is not stated by the Copyright Act. However, Dean submits that 
moral rights are comparable to personality rights which last until the death of the individual; 
and submits that moral rights therefore expire upon the death of the individual.
156
The impact 
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4. THE COPYRIGHT OWNER VS THE PARODIST  
 
This section seeks to analyse the two parties involved in parody cases where there is a claim 
of copyright infringement.  The parties involved are the copyright owner, who claims that his 
or her rights have been infringed by the parodist; and the parodist, who seeks to use parody as 
a defence so as to escape liability for the alleged infringement. The question here is therefore, 
how and where do the two parties come into conflict? 
The copyright owner has economic rights and moral rights to his or her works. As it has been 
indicated above, there can be a distinction between the copyright owner and the author of the 
work.  Thus ownership of copyright and ownership of moral rights may vest in different 
individuals.  However for the purposes of this dissertation (and because of space constraints) 
this dissertation will assume that the owner is also the author. In order to secure these rights, 
the Copyright Act makes provision for the copyright owner to have and exercise certain 
exclusive rights when it comes to their works. Parodists, on the other hand, take works 
belonging to others, and use elements of those works to create new and independent works. 
For a parodist to use copyrighted works (provided that it is a substantial part of their works, 
as the law does not deal with trivialities) without obtaining permission from the copyright 
owner is to infringe the copyright owners’ exclusive rights. It is therefore clear as to how 
parodists and copyright owners may come into conflict.  
Reynolds recognizes that a many works of parody come into conflict with copyright law 
because parody usually involves reproducing certain portions of the original 
work.
157
Reproduction is an exclusive right of a copyright owner. Because parody is only 
successful when the audience recognise the original work, it is necessary that a parodist 
reproduce the original work in sufficient detail so that the audience can recognize it. This in 
essence is how the conflict between the two parties arises. 
Many academics agree with the nature and cause of the tension between the copyright owner 
and the parodist. It has been stated that parodists must “recall” the original work to the 
audience. Aggarwal agrees with this and states that there must be a “close relation” between 
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parody and the original work.
158
 This is of course necessary in order for the audience to recall 
the original work, thus resulting in a successful parody. The Harvard Law Review 
Association
159
 points out that the extensive use made of the original work by some parodists 
brings parodies into conflict with copyright law. 
Saha and Mukherjee agree that the copyright owner and parodists have some conflicts.
160
 The 
authors identify three specific areas of intellectual property that conflict with parody.
161
  The 
first conflict is that of parody against the author’s right over duplication and distribution of 
their works. The second conflict is between parody and a public figures right of publicity, in 
that parody can violate a public figures right of publicity by holding him up to ridicule. The 
third conflict is that of parody against the moral right of authors by modifying an author’s 
work in a manner that injures an author’s integrity. Parody has often been seen as infringing 
moral rights and has thus been criticized in this regard.
162
As mentioned above, the impact of 
moral rights on parody will be evaluated. This will be done in order to determine whether the 
issue of moral rights and the infringement thereof, is so severe as to validly prevent a defence 
of parody from being enacted. 
Scholars who have written about the impact of parody on moral rights seem to agree that 
moral rights should not be a bar to the enactment of a defence of parody. According to 
Aggarwal, a true parody does not infringe an author’s paternity rights.
163
 This is because an 
author of a “true parody” does not try to disguise a work as if it is his or her own. 
164
“Since 
parody is aimed at the author's modes of expression and characteristic turns of thought or 
phrase, it is principally an attack upon the author's personality manifested in his or her 
creation”.
165
 In cases of true parody therefore, the relevant moral right at issue is the right of 
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integrity. In light of these observations  Aggarwal  argues that it makes no sense to put 
parody within the context of moral rights to integrity to begin with, due to the fact that parody 





 agree with Aggarwal. The authors 
argue that parody “does not constitute a mutilation, distortion or modification of an existing 
work”; instead parody is the creation of an entirely new work that uses an underlying work to 
do so. By the same token, Deazley
168
 argues that “just as we should tolerate the fact that a 
critical or unflattering parody might negatively influence the commercial prospects of the 
underlying work, so too should we ensure that the moral rights regime is not invoked by 
authors as a shield to against unwelcomed criticism”. 
4.1 Is there a need to accommodate both the copyright owner and the parodist within the law? 
 
It is argued that there is a need to protect parody because parody has social value. The social 
value of parody has been discussed in detail above. In addition, some of the criticisms of 
parody have been discussed followed by the arguments by Deazley refuting all such 
criticisms, thus indicating that these criticisms are not strong enough to bar an introduction of 
a defence of parody. Parody has been commended for its function in promoting democracy 
by being a form of freedom of expression, for promoting creativity, inspiring and promoting 
political debate and political scrutiny, introducing and promoting the development of new 
culture and works.
169
  It is also important to consider that a parody may enhance a copyright 
owner’s economic return on his or her work, because parody may increase exposure and thus 
a demand for the original work.
170
In light of the above mentioned, parody is therefore clearly 
beneficial to society and it is suggested therefore that its benefits and importance cannot be 
ignored.  
As has been discussed previously, copyright law needs to balance the needs of the copyright 
owner and the needs of the public and as discussed previously; copyright owners have a right 
to remuneration from their creativity as this is vital as an incentive to encourage creativity. 
The major concern with the issue of balance however is how far intellectual property 
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protection should extend and how to establish a proper balance between the rights of 
copyright owners and the public interest. Bollier is of the view that copyright protection is 
“seriously out of whack”.
171
 This means that intellectual property has gone beyond 
reasonable boundaries and that the extensive protection that is now granted to copyright 
owners is reducing creativity.
172
 Therefore as much as the positive effects of copyright law 
are recognized, the major one being to encourage creativity, the negative impacts are also 
rising (that is creativity may be being suppressed). The failure to protect parody is an 
indication of how the rights of the copyright owner are being emphasised to the detriment of 
the public interest therefore pointing to an imbalance of the rights of the respective parties. 
From the above, it can be seen that both the copyright owner and the parodist have vital 
functions to perform in society. This is because both the copyright owner and the parodists 
contribute to society making them both a valuable asset to the world. To exclude any one of 
them in law would be to deprive society of worthy creations. It is therefore necessary that 
both the copyright owners and the parodists of our societies be accommodated within the law. 
This then raises the issue of how this should be done. 
 
4.2 Accommodating competing interests 
 
Since it has been clearly established that both the copyright owner and the parodist are 
needed in society, despite the apparent conflicts that exist in between both these parties; the 
next question which needs to be considered is how to accommodate both the interests of the 
parodists and the copyright owners. As this is an area of the law which has not been 
developed in South Africa several other jurisdictions will be considered in order to establish 
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5. A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
As pointed out in the introduction, the issue of conflict between the parodist and the 
copyright owner has been subject to a number of court decisions and academic writings in 
several other jurisdictions. Several writings and court decisions from three jurisdictions will 
now be considered in order to ascertain whether there are any lessons that South Africa can 
learn. 
The jurisdictions to be considered are the following: 
 The United States of America (USA) 
 Canada; and 
 The United Kingdom (UK) 
5.1 The United States of America  
Unlike South Africa, the USA courts have had the opportunity to deal with issues of parody 
on many occasions. The USA has therefore developed a whole body of law relating to parody 
from which South Africa can learn. A discussion of copyright law in the United States will 
follow, together with an analysis of the treatment of parody by USA courts. 
5.1.1 The law of copyright 
Copyright law in the USA is based upon the legislation of Congress.
173
 Congress was granted 
legislative powers in the Constitution of March 4, 1789, to make copyright laws.
174
 In this 
regard, the Constitution authorizes Congress “to promote the progress of science and useful 
arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their 
respective writings and discoveries”.
175
 
The USA copyright system is based on “the fundamental premise that vindication of the 
economic interests of authors will ultimately maximize the information available to the 
public”.
176
 Therefore the goal of American copyright law is “utilitarian” that is, to maximize 
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The first copyright statute in the USA was passed in 1790.
178
 Several revisions of the Act 
took place until the passing of the Copyright Act of 1909.
179
 Thereafter, there were further 
revisions, until 1976, at which time the current Copyright Act was passed, that is the 
Copyright Act of 1976.
180
Copyright law in the USA can thus be divided into two parts. That 
is, copyright law prior to 1976 and copyright law after 1976. 
Prior to the introduction of the 1976 Copyright Act, copyright law was governed by both 
common law and statute.
181
 Under this regime, unpublished works were protected 
automatically by common law, and this protection accrued at the moment of creation of the 
work.
182
 If the work was subsequently published, the common law protection was 
extinguished, and protection by statute would then accrue.
183
 Therefore the common law of 
copyright and the copyright statute existed alongside one another. However after the 
introduction of the Copyright Act of 1976, the common law method of protecting copyright 
was terminated and only statutory protection became available as a means of protecting 
copyright.
184
 Therefore, both published and unpublished works are now protected under the 
1976 statute. 
One of the defences to a claim of copyright infringement under USA copyright law is the 
defence of fair use. 
The USA Copyright ‘fair dealing’ provision provides as follows: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a 
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phono records or 
by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, 
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news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, 
or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made 
of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall 
include—  
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such 
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. 
The four factors listed in s107 of the American Copyright Act of 1976 first arose from the 
case of Folsom v Marsh
185
. This case first listed these factors as criteria used to determine fair 
use. These factors were then later codified in s107.
186
  
The concept of fair use has been described as “the most troublesome in the whole of 
copyright law”.
187
 This could possibly be due to the failure of the legislature to define fair 
use.
188
 The factors listed in s107 Copyright Act 1976, are not aimed or intended to define fair 
use.
189
 Instead, they were merely intended to be “guidelines”.
190
 Furthermore, the factors 
listed in s107 are not exhaustive; instead they are simply illustrative of what may be 
considered to be fair use.
191
The factors are defined in general terms in order to leave courts 
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with discretion as to the application of the factors.
192
 It is also important to note in this regard 
that the Act does not give courts any guidance as to how much weight should be attached to 
each of the factors.
193
 The weight attached to each factor would thus depend on the particular 
circumstances of the case.
194
 The use of the words “include” and “including” in s107 
indicates that the statute was intended to be used in a flexible manner and strict application is 
not what is required.
195
 In interpreting s107, the courts seem to have realised that Congress 




5.1.2 Approach to parody 
Parody is not specifically listed as a purpose falling under the fair use doctrine in the USA. 
The purposes that are listed are those of criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching 
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship and research.
197
However, 
legislative history (as evidenced by the House Report No. 94-1476) shows that parody is 
included as an example “of the sort of activities the courts might regard as fair use”.
198
 It may 
be arguable that inclusion of parody as an example of fair use in the House Report mentioned 
above demonstrates that the legislatures had recognised parody as being able to pass the four 
factors listed in s107.In turn, this may be illustrative of the intention of Congress to leave the 
doctrine of fair use to apply flexibly, as mentioned above. 
According to Banko, because parody was never listed as a purpose falling under fair use in 
the Act, it necessarily follows that a defence of parody must be considered individually, in 
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A study of the cases reveals that there are two models which the courts use to determine 
whether there has been fair use.  These two models are the economic model and the 
reasonableness model.
200
Under the economic model of fair use, fair use is determined by the 
social value of the work and the commercial harm to the original works that is, whether it 
competes with the market of the original work.
201
 It therefore seems that the economic model 
turns on the determination of whether the secondary work (of the parodist) has substituted the 
market of the original work.
202
 On the other hand, the reasonableness model determines fair 
use according to the amount of work that has been taken from the original work.
203
 
The Harvard Law Review Publishing Association argues that parody cases have been 
influenced more by the reasonableness model.
204
 The problem with using the reasonableness 
model is that the focus on the amount taken is not in line with promoting the utilitarian 
purpose of copyright law in America, namely, to increase public access to information.
205
 For 
example, a parody building onto a prior work yet not substituting the prior work 
commercially, would qualify for protection according to the economic model; but under  the 
reasonableness model  the same parody may be regarded as unfair due to the fact that the 
parodists have relied on substantial portions of the original works when making their 
                                                          
199
 J R Banko ‘Schlurppes Tonic Bubble Bath: In Defense Of Parody’ (1990) 11:3 U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L. 627, 
640. 
200
Harvard Law Review Publishing Association ‘The Parody Defense To Copyright Infringement’ (1984) 




 See Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) where economic harm was 
considered a fundamental factor when considering the fairness of a use. See also Sony Corp. of America v Unit 
City Studios 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
203
 Harvard Law Review Publishing Association ‘The Parody Defense To Copyright Infringement’ (1984) 
Harvard LR 1400: The “amount taken” factor is important here, it determines whether the use is reasonable, and 
accordingly whether it is fair. 
204
Ibid.  For example see Quinto v Legal Times of Washington, Inc, 506 F. Supp. 554(D.C.C 1981) where the 
court determined fairness in accordance with the amount taken. 
205
 Harvard Law Review Publishing Association ‘The Parody Defense To Copyright Infringement’ (1984) 





Accordingly, the reasonableness model does not help towards the goal of 
increasing public access to knowledge and creativity.
207
 
According to Banko, the USA’s copyright regime in dealing with parody establishes three 
things: first, the parody defence is consistent with the provisions of the American Copyright 
Act. Second, the parody defence allows for freedom of expression for the producer of the 
parody, the public and the consumer and thirdly the parody defence does not prevent those 
whose works have been infringed for purely commercial reasons from being protected from 
harm.
208
 Accordingly Banko holds that parody is a legitimate, fair use of copyrighted material 
even where the parody has commercial value-as long as there is no injury in terms of 
commercial harm that is caused by the work of parody to the copyright holder.
209
 In the 
opinion of Banko, where there is no direct competition between an original and a secondary 
work, the social value of parody will outweigh the copyright holder’s interests in preventing 
his or her work from use by a parodist.
210
As it will be seen below, this in essence has been 
the approach of the USA courts in cases concerning parody. 
5.1.3 Case Law 
The leading case in America is Campbell v Acuff-Rose, Inc 510 US 569 (1994) where the 
American Supreme Court examined the four factors for fair use in great detail and applied 
them to the issue of parody.  The principles established in this case were then later relied 
upon in Suntrust Bank v Houghton
211
 and in Salinger v Colting
212
. 
5.1.3.1 Campbell v Acuff-Rose 
As pointed out above this is the leading case dealing with fair use and parody in the USA. 
The facts of the case are as follows. The respondents (Acuff-Rose) were the copyright owners 
of a song written by Roy Orbison and William Dee. The song was entitled “Oh, Pretty 
Woman”. A rock band called “2 Live Crew” wrote a song entitled “Pretty Woman”. The 
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manager of the band informed Acuff-Rose that the song “Pretty Woman” was a parody of 
“Oh Pretty Woman” and that they were willing to give credit to Acuff-Rose, Dees and 
Orbison for the authorship and ownership of the song. The manager also informed them that 
they were willing to pay a fee to make use of the song. Acuff-Rose refused the permission for 
the use of the song. Nonetheless, 2 Live Crew released the song, whilst acknowledging Dees 
and Orbison as the authors and Acuff-Rose as publisher of the song. Nearly a year after the 
release of Pretty Woman Acuff-Rose, and its recording company Luke Skyywalker Records, 
instituted an action for copyright infringement. 
The District Court found that the band had made fair use of the original song.
213
 This court 
found that the commercial purpose of the parody did not mean that a defence of fair use could 
not succeed and granted summary judgment for 2 Live Crew.
214
 
 The case went on to be heard in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, where the 
decision of the district court was reversed and remanded.
215
 The Court of Appeals stated that 
the District court did not take proper consideration of the fact that all commercial use 
purposes are presumably unfair.
216
 The court then went to hold that the commercial nature of 
the parody as a consideration in the first of the four factors in s107, weighed against a finding 
of fair use.
217
 The court held that 2 Live Crew had taken the “heart of the original” song and 
thus had taken substantially from the original work.
218
 After noting that commercial harm to 
the market of the original was established due to the presumption of commercial use of the 
parody, the court ultimately found that a case for fair use could not succeed.
219
 
The matter then proceeded to the Supreme Court where the court again concerned the issue of 
whether 2 live Crew’s commercial parody could constitute fair use.
220
 The Supreme Court 
analysed each of the fair use factors in s107 to decide on the issue of fairness. 
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In considering the first factor, namely, “the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or for non-profit educational purposes”, the court 
stated that this enquiry may be guided by the examples of purposes for fair use given by the 
preamble in s107.
221
 The purpose of this enquiry, the court noted, was to investigate whether 
the new work only “supercedes the objects” of the original work or it “adds something new, 




  The court was also of the view that the commercial or non-profit educational purpose of a 
work is only one element of the first factor.
223
 With regards to commerciality of the use, the 
court was  of the opinion that “if commerciality carried presumptive force against a finding of 
unfairness then the presumption would swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the 
preamble paragraph of s107…since these activities are generally conducted for profit in this 
country”.
224
 The Supreme Court thus explicitly rejected the importance that the issue of 
commerciality was given by the Court of Appeals. 
The next factor that the court analysed was the “nature of the copyrighted work”.
225
The court 
stated that this factor requires recognition that some works are “closer to the core of intended 
copyright protection than others” and thus fair use is harder to establish when works closer to 
the core of copyright protection are copied.
226
The court found that this factor was not of 
much value to this assessment since parodies almost always copy publicly known expressive 
works.
227
 It is submitted that the court’s interpretation of this factor is reasonable because if 
this factor had to be given great consideration it would ultimately destroy nearly all cases of 
parody, as most cases of parody involve works that are well known by the public. 
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The third factor that the court analysed was that of “the amount and substantiality of the 
potion used in regard to copyrighted work as a whole”.
228
 The court said that with this factor 
“attention turns to the persuasiveness of a parodists justification for the particular copying 
done, and the enquiry will harken back to the first of the statutory factors for, as in prior 
cases, we recognize that the extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and 
character of the use”.
229
 The court was in agreement with the Court of Appeals in that what 
was to be considered here was the value of the underlying work used, namely the “quantity”, 
“quality” and “importance” of the work.
230
 The court further agreed with the Supreme Court 
in that the relevant question to ask when considering this factor is whether a “substantial” 
part was copied from the underlying work.
231
 The court noted, in attempting to answering this 
question that a parody must in any case “conjure up” enough of the original work in order for 
the audience to identify it.
232
 However, the court stated that once enough has been taken to 
ensure that the audience recognizes the work, the reasonableness of any further appropriation, 
depends on “the extent to which the songs overriding purpose and character is to parody the 




Furthermore, the court noted that copying does not become substantial merely because the 
part taken was the “heart” of the underlying work.
234
The court was of the opinion that if a 
less significant part of the original song had been used for the parody, then it is hard to see 
how its parodic character would have been recognizable.
235
 At the same time however, the 
court made it known that one would not just get away with taking substantial parts of 
another’s work. Context was to be considered when determining this.
236
The court ultimately 
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agreed that “no more was taken than necessary”, and therefore the court found that the 
copying was not excessive even though the heart of the original was taken.
237
 
The last factor that the court considered was that of “the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work”.
238
 The court noted in this regard that what 
needed to be considered here was “whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort 
engaged in by the defendant…would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential 
market” of the original.
239
 The court stated that this factor also required the consideration of 
any potential harm to the market of the derivative works of the original.
240
 The court was of 
the opinion that a parody would not disturb the market of the original work as a parody has 
different functions to the original.
241
The court was of the view that the Court of Appeals erred 
in finding that there was harm to the market of the original, as there was no evidence showing 
such harm to the original caused by 2 Live Crew’s parody.
242
 The court ultimately reversed 
the Court of Appeals finding. This case was then heavily relied upon in a subsequent decision 
involving a parody of a well-known book entitled Gone With The Wind. 
5.1.3.2 Suntrust Bank v Houghton 
The facts of the case are as follows. Suntrust is the trustee of Michell Trust which holds 
copyright in Gone With The Wind (GWTW).GWTW is one of the most popular books every 
written second only to the Bible.
243
This is a story, written by Margaret Mitchell in 1936 about 
the south in America at the time of the American Civil War.  It focuses primarily on a heroine 
called Scarlett who faces many challenges, one of them being the jealousy she experiences 
when the man she loves, a character by the name of Ashley, marries her cousin Melanie. In 
2001 Alice Randall wrote a novel entitled The Wind Done Gone (TWDG) which was written 
as a criticism of the way in which GWTW had depicted the events of the American civil war. 
The story was told from the perspective of a slave (Cynara) and presented a very different 
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picture of the highly romanticised version of how slaves were treated in GWTW. Suntrust 
instituted an action for copyright infringement against Randall, alleging four things: 
 that TWDG refers to GWTW in its foreword; 
 that TWDG appropriates characters and their traits as well as relationships of 
GWTW; 
 that TWDG copies plots and scenes from GWTW; and  
 that TWDG copies verbatim dialogues and descriptions from GWTW.  
Houghton-Mifflin (publisher of TWDG) asserted that TWDG was a parody of GWTW and 
was protectable under the fair use doctrine. 
The question to be decided by the court in this case was whether the publication of TWDG (a 
fictional novel which the author admitted was based on GWTW) ought to be prohibited from 
publication because of the alleged copyright infringement.
244
 In order to answer this question 
the court focused on the defence of fair use, however, before the court looked into the 
doctrine of fair use, it made some important observations with regards to copyright law. The 
court considered the idea/expression dichotomy and stated that this dichotomy incorporates 
the First Amendments goal of encouraging debate and the free flow of ideas.
245
The court 
accepted that holding a person liable for copying another’s expression does not impede the 
First Amendment as the public can make free use of ideas.  He or she could just not make use 
of someone else’s expression of those ideas.
246
 
With regards to parody the court relied heavily on the lessons in the Campbell case regarding 
the issue of fair use.
247
The court reiterated what was said in Campbell, namely that all four 
factors had to be considered and the results from this had to be assessed in light of the 
purposes of copyright law.
248
 Before discussing the four factor test of fair use, the court 
began with looking at whether a “parodic character may be reasonably conceived”.
249
 The 
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court noted that the court in Campbell had defined parody confusingly as it first seemed to 
suggest that parody had to have a comic effect, and then later it described parody in wider 
terms in that it was a commentary on the original work.
250
 The court here chose the latter 
definition of parody and said “we will treat a work as parody if its aim is to comment 
upon/criticize a prior work by appropriating elements of the original in creating a new 
artistic, as opposed to a scholarly, journalistic work”.
251
In the light of this meaning of parody, 
the court decided that TWDG was a criticism of the depiction of slavery in GWTW and that 
the way in which Randall chose to convey this criticism meant that the work amounted to a 
fair use of the original work.
252
 
The court then went on to assess each of the four factors in turn. With regards to the first 
factor the court found that there were two aspects to this enquiry. One was whether TWDG 
was for commercial or non-profit educational purposes, whilst the other was whether TWDG 
was transformative.
253
 In looking at the former aspect the court stated that TWDG clearly had 
commercial value.
254
 The court stated that the fact that TWDG was intended for profit weighs 
against a finding of fair use, however in this particular case, TWDG’s “profit status is 
strongly overshadowed and outweighed in view of its highly transformative use”.
255
The court 
followed the Campbell reasoning with regards to this aspect, that is, that the other factors 
weighing against fair use will be less significant if the new work is transformative.
256
 In 
assessing the transformative value of the work, the question to be answered (as was stated in 




The court noted that the transformative enquiry was double-sided in this case.
258
 This is 
because in one way, TWDG was transformative in that the story was told from the 
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perspective of one of the slaves instead of from the perspective of the plantation owners 
added new meaning to GWTW yet at the same time it also relied heavily on GWTW.
259
 
The court described TWDG as being “a critical statement that seeks to rebut and destroy the 
perspective, judgments, and mythology of GWTW”.
260
 The court found that in the last half of 
TWDG a completely new story is told and the direct referral to Mitchell’s plot and its 
characters was done so as to criticize GWTW.
261
 In light of these factors the court found 
itself in a position where it could not contend that Randall did not work up something new.
262
 
The court, as in the Campbell decision, did not look into the nature of the copyrighted work 
as this factor was found not to carry much weight in cases of parody.
263
 
With regards to the “amount and substantiality of the portion used” the court noted that 
although TWDG had taken extensively from the original, the portions taken were however 
transformed so as to acquire new significance.
264
 
In determining the effect on the market value of the original, the court again referred to 
Campbell, that is, it was not the impairment of the market which caused harm; instead, it was 
the usurpation of the market.
265
The court ruled that the work was protected by the defence of 
fair dealing. 
5.1.3.3 Salinger v Colting 
This is another case which deals with parody. The interesting thing about this case is that 
although the court relied on the four factors as discussed in the Campbell case, the court 
concluded that the work was not a parody deserving of protection. This is different to the 
above two cases where the court found that the new works were deserving of protection. 
Salinger published The Catcher in the Rye which became really successful. 60 years later 
Colting wrote 60years later: coming through the Rye (60 years later). Colting published 60 
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years later without seeking and acquiring the permission of Salinger. Salinger then brought 
an action against Colting because of the extreme similarities between the two works. Salinger 
also alleged that the defendant tried to market 60 years later as a sequel to The Catcher in the 
Rye as the back cover of one of its editions described the novel as “a marvellous sequel to one 
of our most beloved classics”.
266
Colting however denied this. 
The court in this matter also evaluated the fair use factors. With regards to the first factor, the 
court held that 60 years later was not sufficiently transformative.
267
 The court was also of the 
view that the work did not parody the work itself; at most, the work parodied the author of 
The Catcher in the Rye.
268
 The court drew from the judgment in Campbell in concluding that 
the comment or criticism must be towards the work itself at the least.
269
 
Some of the reasons why the court found that the work was not transformative include the 
public statements  made by the defendant stating that his work was a sequel and the borrowed 
work as compared to the transformative elements in Catcher were too high to make the entire 
work a transformative one.
270
The commercial nature of the secondary work also mitigated 
against a finding of fair use.
271
 The second factor of the fair use test was found to be of not 
much assistance, as it was found in the case of Campbell and in Salinger v Colting.
272
 
When considering the third factor the court found that Colting had taken more than necessary 
for the supposed purpose of criticizing Salinger.
273
 
In evaluating the fourth factor the court found that this factor slightly weighed towards the 
original author’s advantage.
274
 This was because even though the secondary work was not 
likely to have a negative impact on the sales of the original work, an unauthorized sequel 
could possibly impact on the market for any future authorized sequel.
275
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The court ultimately found when assessing the four factors as set out in s107 that none of the 
factors supported a case of fair use and thus the defence of fair use could not succeed.
276
The 
court granted Salinger a preliminary injunction. 
The matter then proceeded to the Court of Appeals. In this court, the court noted that it was 
difficult to predict whether a defence for fair use was likely to succeed as it depended heavily 
on the judge’s perceptions.
277
 The Court of Appeals, although finding that the District court 
had only considered the first fair use factor, agreed with the District court in that the 
defendants were unlikely to succeed on their fair use defence.
278
 
5.1.4 Concluding remarks regarding the cases 
The Campbell case set a benchmark for how the four factors in s107 of the Copyright Act 
were to be applied in cases of parody. This can be seen by the subsequent cases which rely 
heavily on the reasoning of the court in Campbell. Saha and Muckerjee agree that the 
American courts have “remained scrupulously faithful to the Campbell ratio”.
279
Friedman is 
also in agreement with this opinion and states that the courts have “applied the same 
analytical framework”, however, “the results are not always easy to reconcile”.
280
 Therefore 
even though the same rule of law has been applied the conclusion of these cases has not been 
the same. Friedman states that the outcome of the cases is heavily dependent on how a judge 
chooses to apply the ratio in Campbell, that is, whether the judge’s application of the factors 
is strict or lenient.
281
It seems that the outcome of the first factor is directive of whether the 
fair use defence will succeed or not and thus the more transformative the work the more 
likely that it will be regarded as fair use.
282
 For example, in Campbell the court considered 
the work to be transformative; in Suntrust Bank, the court also considered the parody to be 
transformative; however in Salinger the court did not consider the work to be transformative. 
The outcome of these cases (that is whether the new work was fair use or not) then followed 
the question of whether the new work was transformative; thus the transformative works 
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(Campbell and Suntrust Bank) were considered to be fair use and the non-transformative 
work (Salinger) was not considered as fair use. 
5.2 The United Kingdom (UK) 
The UK provision on fair dealing is similar to the South African fair dealing provision. Until 
recently, the UK and South African law on fair dealing was very similar but there have been 
some development in the UK which have not occurred in South Africa. 
5.2.1 The Law of Copyright 
In the UK, copyright protection is provided for in the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
1988 (herein after referred to as the CDPA). The CDPA repealed and replaced the Copyright 
Act of 1956.
283
 The reason for this was that the 1956 Act was “both complicated and badly 
structured”.
284
 Another issue which indicated that there was a need for a new Act was the fast 




The fair dealing doctrine in the UK is said to be rooted in the doctrine of “fair 
abridgement”.
286
 Fair abridgment was first introduced in Gyles v. Wilcox, Barrow, and Nutt 
(1741) 2 Atk. 141.
287
 The court explained that a “real and fair abridgment . . . may with great 
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propriety be called a new book, because the invention, learning, and judgment of the author 
are shown in it, and in many cases abridgments are extremely useful”.
288
 
Chapter III of the CDPA allows for certain acts that would normally constitute an 
infringement to copyrighted works, to be exempt as such. Fair dealing, which is codified in 
ss29 and 30 of the CDPA in the UK, is one such exception to copyright infringement. It 
allows for certain specified acts to be done without there being infringement of copyright- 
provided that the dealing is fair. Fair dealing is permitted for the following purposes: research 
or private study, criticism or review and news reporting.
289
 It is thus irrelevant whether the 
use is fair in general or is fair for purposes beyond the enumerated purposes.
290
 In each of 
these purposes, however, fair dealing is the overriding requirement.
291
 This means that once a 
specific purpose is found, fairness of the use still needs to be established. Fair dealing is not 
defined by the Act. It has been submitted however that it is a question of “degree and 
impression”.
292
 Guidance as to what factors may be used to determine what is fair may be 
obtained from case law.
293
 Some of these factors are that of quantity and quality of the 
copyrighted work that was used, the use that was made of the work (particularly whether the 




The defence of fair dealing is available only to acts that comply or fit the listed purposes 
within the fair dealing provision. The limited purposes are the very reason that the fair 
dealing doctrine has been under attack.
295
 The doctrine of fair dealing in the UK, as will be 
discussed later, is therefore very similar to the South African fair dealing defence. 
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However, Brenncke is of the opinion that with regards to whether the dealing is fair, the UK 
copyright system is similar to that of the US fair use factors as the factors that were 
developed by the English courts to determine fairness resemble the four factors listed in s107 
of the Copyright Act of 1976.
296
The difference here is that US courts are permitted to 
consider any other factor they consider is relevant to the case at hand, even if it is not 
specifically mentioned in the section. Accordingly, it has been suggested by Brenncke that if 
the fair use test were to replace fair dealing in the CDPA, then there would be no need to 
integrate the four factors into the copyright legislation.
297
The provision could simply contain 
a list of the purposes for which fair dealing may be claimed and the determination of fairness 
could then be left to the factors that were developed by the English courts.
298
 
To claim fair dealing in UK copyright law, 3 things have to be shown by the alleged 
infringer: firstly, that the use falls within one of the listed purposes within the Act; secondly, 
that the dealing was fair and thirdly, that in the case of criticism, review and news reporting  
there must be sufficient acknowledgment of the original work.
299
 
5.2.2 Approach to parody 
In 2005 Andrew Gowers (who has been part of the Head of Communications in Lehman 
Brothers since 2006 and prior to that an editor of the Financial Times) was asked to review 
the UK Intellectual Property system to establish whether the system was fit for purpose in an 
era of globalisation, digitisation and increasing economic specialisation and to make 
recommendations.
300
 Gowers found that the current fair dealing provisions were overly 
stringent
301
and recommended that more permitted purposes, such as parody should be 
incorporated as a permitted purpose so as to increase the flexibility of the current fair dealing 
provisions.
302
It must be noted however that Gower did not recommend that the UK introduce 
a fair use doctrine similar to that found in the USA. 
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Unfortunately, however the Intellectual Property Office’s (IPO), in its second stage 
consultation document rejected Gower’s recommendation for the introduction of a new 
parody exception within copyright law.
303
The basis for its rejection was that the Copyright 
Act of 1988 was well equipped to accommodate parody as it currently stands and therefore a 
specific defence for parody is not needed.
304
 The IPO stated that parody under the current 
regime is accommodated in three circumstances: If firstly, the parodist uses an insubstantial 
amount or parts of the underlying work
305
; or secondly, if parodist used the copyrighted work 
for purposes of criticism
306
; or thirdly, the parodist obtains a license and is granted 
permission to use the work in the intended manner.
307
 
Deazley refutes all three of the IPO’s reasons as to why a defence for parody is not needed. 
The author submits that the first reason for the rejection of a parody defence cannot be relied 
upon by parodists because parody often requires that a substantial part of the underlying work 
be taken in order to conjure up the original.
308
 With regards to the second situation, the author 
states that parody that is not critical (such as when it is just comical) will not be protected and 
so the parodist cannot rely on this defence.
309
 Lastly, the author notes that the third situation 
for lawful parody cannot be relied upon since copyright owners are often not willing to 
license critical and or offensive parodies.
310
 
In May 2011, Ian Hargreaves
311
submitted a review of the UK’s intellectual property laws.
312
 
The aim of the review was to adapt the intellectual property framework in the UK so as to 
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promote greater innovation and growth of the UK economy.
313
The Hargreaves Review also 
recommended that a copyright exception for parody should be included in the legislation.
314
A 
few months later, the UK government announced that it did intend to introduce an exception 
for parody.
315
This announcement has been welcomed as a positive change for parodists and is 
also seen as a sign that the role of parody in society is being recognised.
316
 
5.2.3 Case Law 
Although there is very little case law addressing the issue of parody with regard to copyright 
law in the UK there are some important decisions which illustrate how the courts have 
interpreted the problem.  The first one was Glyn v Weston Feature Film Company.
317
 This 
was then followed by Joy music v Sunday Pictorial (1920) Ltd
318
and finally there was 
Schweppes v Wellingtons.
319
These cases highlight the problems that parodists face in 
attempting to defend their works and thus demonstrate that if parody is recognized as having 
a valid place in society there is a need to ensure that copyright law accommodates it 
appropriately. 
5.2.3.1 Glyn v Weston Feature Film Company 
In this case, the plaintiff, Glyn, was the author of a novel entitled Three Weeks. The 
defendant, Weston Feature Film Company (the Company) was responsible for a parodic film 
entitled “Pimple’s Three Week’s (Without the Option)”. Glyn alleged that the Company’s 
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film reproduced substantial portions of his novel and asked the court for an injunction to 
restrain the Company from selling or authorizing public exhibition of these films or for 
further infringing his copyright. 
The Company claimed that their works were original works and denied that there were 
similarities between the two works.
320
It also argued that if one work is a serious work and the 
other is a parody of it, then the parody is not an infringement of the former. Rather it is a 
separate and new work distinct from the former.
321
 
The court expressed its distaste of certain episodes in Glyn’s novel and described it as 
“grossly immoral” and as “nothing more or less than a sensual adulterous intrigue”.
322
 For 
this reason the court was of the view that the novel should be debarred entirely from 
obtaining protection from the court.
323
 The court warned however that their distaste of the 
novel was not to be a decisive issue to the resolution of the case.
324
Ultimately the court found 
that large parts of the film were works that were not involving the novel and vice versa.
325
 
After these considerations the court decided that the film does not infringe copyright in the 
novel.
326
 The court also stated that a “burlesque is usually the best possible advertisement of 




5.2.3.2 Joy Music v Sunday Pictorial (1920) Ltd 
This particular case involved a newspaper article which contained a parody of a popular song 
entitled “Rock-a-Billy”. The parody was related to the subject matter of the article. The 
parody of the song was described as the writer’s version of the song and the writer 
acknowledged the music publishers as copyright holders of the song. The similarity that was 
alleged between the parody and the original song was that the parody contained the words 
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“Rock-a Phillip, rock” whereas the chorus of the original work (the song) used the words 
“Rock-a-Billy, rock”. 
The plaintiff (Joy Music Ltd.) was the copyright owner of the song “Rock-a-Billy, rock”, 
sought to restrain the parody from being published on the grounds that the parody was a 
reproduction of a substantial part of the original work and therefore was an infringement of 
copyright. 
The court relied on the dictum in Glyn v Weston which was “whether the defendant has 
bestowed such mental labour upon what he has taken and has subjected it to such revision 
and alteration as to produce an original result”.
328
. 
The court asked whether the defendant had reproduced a “substantial part of the work”, in 
order to answer the question of mental labour.
329
According to the court, this was a matter to 
be determined by fact.
330
 
Ultimately the court held that the article was a new work that was derived from the 
underlying work (Rock-a-Billy),
331
 but that there was “sufficient independent new work by 
Paul Boyle” so as to make it a new original.
332
 It was held, therefore, that there was no 
copyright infringement in this case. 
5.2.3.3 Schweppes v Wellingtons 
This case represents a departure from the previous case. In this case, the court completely 
rejected McNair J’s approach in the Joy Music case. 
In this case the plaintiff (Schweppes) claimed copyright infringement because they argued 
that the defendant (Wellingtons) was using labels which were very similar to their labels. The 
plaintiff’s labels had the trademark “Schweppes” as a label and the Wellingtons used a 
similar trademark but changed the word Schweppes to “Schlurppes”. The defendants’ 
claimed that their label was made with the purpose of being a parody of the plaintiff’s label. 
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On the issue of infringement, the court asked the question whether the defendant’s label is 
similar so as to be a “reproduction of a substantial part of the plaintiffs” work.
333
The court 
suggested that to make this determination, both labels should be looked at, at the same 
time.
334
 The court noted in this regard that artistically, the layout of the labels were “virtually 
identical”.
335
 The judge noted that there was no doubt that the defendants work had been a 
reproduction of a very substantial part of the plaintiffs work.
336
 
The defence relied on McNair J’s decision in Joy Music, and tried to convince the courts that 
the appropriate test was whether the author invested enough “mental labour” on the work so 
as to produce an original.
337
 
Falconer however did not agree with this test. He suggested that “the test every time, is, as 
the statute makes perfectly plain: has there been a reproduction in the defendant’s work of a 
substantial part of the plaintiff’s work.”
338
 The judge explained that the fact that a defendant 
has invested labour so as to produce something original is an irrelevant consideration if 
ultimately that work results in a reproduction of a substantial part of the plaintiffs work.
339
 
In order to find a basis of the test employed by McNair J in Joys Music, Falconer J evaluated 
the reasoning of McNair J and the test used by McNair J to make his decision.
340
 Falconer 
concluded that McNair had employed the “mental labour’ test because he had found no 
reproduction of a substantial part of the plaintiff’s work in the first place, and therefore when 
he employed the “mental labour” test he meant that what had been reproduced was original 
work in that there was no reproduction of any substantial part of the plaintiffs work.
341
 
Falconer stated that if this was not the reason behind the “mental labour” then the decision in 
Joy Music was wrong.
342
Falconer J found ultimately that the defendant had no defence to a 
claim for copyright infringement.
343
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5.2.4 Concluding remarks regarding the cases  
In the Glyn and Joy Music case the courts recognised the ultimate test for infringement to be 
that of substantiality; however the courts used the mental labour test in order to answer the 
issue of substantiality.
344
 Falconer J, in the Schweppes decision, did not follow the mental 
labour test and stated that the only test to be applied was the substantiality test. The 
substantiality test in the UK is problematic as it is unclear what constitutes a substantial part; 
therefore the position in English law has been described as being “unclear”.
345
 Further, a 
more critical problem with the use of the substantiality test is that because parody almost 
always requires extensive takings from an underlying work, it would always be likely to be in 
breach of this test.
346
Due to this, it is not practical to test parody according to the amount 
taken from the underlying work. 
According to Deazley, the reasoning of the court in Joy Music seems to suggest that when 
considering “explicitly derivative works”,  for example parodies, then larger amounts of 
borrowing from the original is allowed before the threshold for substantiality is 
triggered.
347
This is because a user producing original works is allowed to copy more 
extensively than in a situation that involves direct copying such as copying for non-
transformative use.
348
 This is a positive indication as it shows that the courts recognise the 
role that parody has to play in society by allowing greater leeway to parodists before the issue 
of substantiality can be invoked.  
5.3 Canada 
Canada’s fair dealing provision is similar to the South African fair dealing provision in that it 
specifically lists the types of purposes which may be exempted from copyright infringement 
as fair dealing. However, like the UK, there have been some extremely important changes to 
how parody is regulated in Canada. 
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5.3.1 The Law of copyright 
Copyright in Canada is regulated by the Canadian Copyright Act of 1985 (herein after 
referred to as the CCA).Fair dealing in the CCA was first introduced to the CCA of 1921.
349
 
At this stage the fair dealing provision was virtually a “duplicate” of s2 (1) (i) of the 
Copyright Act of the United Kingdom.
350
This provision provided simply that copyright 
would not to be infringed by fair dealing of any work for the purposes of private study, 
research, criticism, review or newspaper summary.
351
 
Under the CCA of 1985, the purposes listed under fair dealing were divided into two parts 
(i.e. research and private study on one hand and criticism, review and news reporting on the 
other) and were also treated differently.
352
One difference between the two is that for the 
purposes of criticism, review, and news reporting; certain acknowledgments are required to 
be made regarding the author of the original work. 
The Canadian fair dealing provisions limit fair dealing to these especially listed purposes.
353
 
Thus the Canadian fair dealing provisions, like the South African fair dealing provisions, do 
not provide an open ended defence which is capable of adapting to any purpose of fair 
dealing. 
For the defence of fair dealing to succeed under the CCA of 1985, three things had to be 
established:  first, the purpose of the dealing must be listed in the Act; then the dealing must 
be fair and finally acknowledgment requirements must be satisfied where they are 
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 These factors, which are described as “triple-tiered” approach, stand at an 
opposite end to the American fair use approach.
355
 
The Canadian approach, prior to the recent developments to fair dealing was clearly similar 
to, if not exactly the same as, the UK fair dealing approach.
356
 
5.3.2 Approach to parody  
Prior to the recent amendments, the CCA did not contain a specific defence for parody.
357
 
During this period, some commentators had argued that fair dealing purposes (especially the 
purpose of criticism) could be interpreted so as to encompass a protection for parody.
358
 
Reynolds disagreed with this argument; he stated that the view that parody can be 
accommodated within the purpose of criticism is based on an assumption that all parodies are 
“necessarily critical”.
359
As discussed under the meaning of parody, there are many 
conceptions of parody; whilst some parodies are critical (such as weapon and target parodies) 
others are not (for example comic parodies). Therefore Reynolds was of the view that parody 
was not well accommodated by the provisions of fair dealing, and a defence for parody 
should be included in the Copyright Act.
360
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In September 2011, the Canadian Government re- proposed that the provision of fair dealing 
be expanded so as to accommodate parody and satire.
361
In doing so the Copyright 
Modernization Act (Bill C-11)
362
 which proposed changes to s29 of the Canadian Copyright 
Act of 1985 was introduced
363
. On November 7 2012, some of the provisions of the Bill C-11 
were proclaimed and became immediately effective, the most relevant section being section 
21 (which includes parody as a purpose for which fair use may be claimed).
364
This 
development for Canada means that parodists now have a specific defence for their works 
and may rely on the Copyright Act and not the courts for a finding of fair use.  
Generally, the Canadian copyright regime was in favour of the protection of copyright 
owner’s rights and was less concerned about the protection of user’s rights.
365
However, even 
prior to the coming into effect of the Copyright Modernization Act, the copyright regime in 
Canada had started to become more aware of the rights of user’s in copyright issues.
366
This 
will be illustrated through a discussion of the case law. 
5.3.3 Case Law  
The cases discussed below were decided before the amendment and serve to highlight the 
difficulties faced by the parodist and therefore the need for a specific defence of parody. The 
first case that is discussed is the case of Compagnie Generale des Etablissements Michelin-
Michelin v National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of 
Canada (CAW-Canada.).
367
  Although this case was not the first case to deal with the issue of 
parody, it is particularly important as it was the first case to deal with parody in relation to the 
fair dealing defence.
368
This case was followed by CCH Canadian Ltd v Law society of Upper 
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 (1996) 71 C.P.R (3d) 348 (Herein after this case is referred to as ‘Michelin v National Automobile’). 
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 in which the court, although not dealing with the issue of parody, laid down some 
important rules regarding how the fair dealing defence should be interpreted. Subsequently, 
in the case of CanWest Media Works Publications Inc. v Horizons Publications Ltd
370
, where 
parody was at issue, the court adopted the reasoning in Michelin. 
 
5.3.3.1 Michelin v National Automobile 
The plaintiff, Michelin, held certain trademarks and copyright in the term “Michelin” and in 
the “Bibendum” design. In 1994, the defendant, CAW, tried to unionize the employees of 
Michelin, and during a campaign, the CAW distributed pamphlets and information sheets that 
reproduced the word “Michelin” and that displayed Michelin’s corporate logo (the 
“Bibendum” design or the Michelin Tire Man). 
Michelin sought damages on grounds that their intellectual property rights were infringed by 
the defendants and sought a permanent injunction to restrain CAW from using any of its 
trademarks and copyrighted work in the future. The defendant claimed that they had the right 
to freedom of expression. On the issue of copyright infringement, the defendants argued that 
their work was a parody and therefore did not infringe copyright.
371
 
Teitelbaum J evaluated the meaning of parody and found that the term ‘parody’ does not 
mean the same as ‘criticism’.
372
The defendants urged the court to consider the decision of 
Campbell in the American Supreme Court.
373
 However Teitelbaum J was of the opinion that 
Canadian law was a “different legal regime”
374
to American law and thus even though the 
Campbell decision was “fascinating”, it was not persuasive in the Canadian courts.
375
 
Teitelbaum J ultimately rejected the defence of parody, holding that “I cannot accept that I 
should give the word "criticism" such a large meaning that it includes parody. In doing so, I 
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would be creating a new exception to the copyright infringement, a step that only Parliament 
would have the jurisdiction to do”.
376
 
5.3.3.2 CCH Canadian Ltd v Law society of Upper Canada 
As pointed out above, this case does not deal with parody; however it deals extensively with 
the fair dealing defence and so it is an important case to consider when dealing with any 
matter where fair dealing is argued. Furthermore, it is important to note that in this case, the 
court makes reference to American law whereas in the previous decision, the court held that 
Canadian law was different to American law. 
In this case the respondents instituted copyright infringement action against the Law Society 
in 1993 alleging that the law society infringed copyright when the Great library reproduced 
copies of the respondents work. The law society denied liability for this claim ,alleging that 
copyright is not infringed when “a single copy of a reported decision ,case summary ,statute 
,regulation or a limited selection of text from a treatise is made by the Great Library staff, or 
one of its patrons on a self-service copier, for the purpose of research”.
377
 
The Appellant (Law Society of Upper Canada) had operated the Great Library. The Great 
Library provided a request-based photocopy service for the members of the law society, the 
judiciary and authorized researchers. The respondents are publishers of legal material.  
The relevant issue was whether the “law society’s dealings with the publishers works fell to 
be excluded under fair dealing s29 Copyright Act…?”
378
.In answering this issue the court 
stated that the Copyright Act has a dual role, that is the “encouragement and dissemination of 
the arts and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator” and it advised that courts 
should always strive to maintain a balance between these two.
379
 
Regarding the issue of fair dealing, the court asked whether the custom photocopying service 
(where the library staff photocopies extracts from legal material and sends it to the requestor) 
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may be protected under fair dealing, which provides a defence against copyright infringement 
for purposes such as research, or private study.
380
 
The court stated that the exception of fair dealing is a “user’s right”.
381
 The court advised that 
when balancing the two objects of copyright law (copyright owner’s interests to a just reward 
and the user’s interest in the dissemination of information) in order to ensure that proper 
balancing be achieved, fair dealing “must not be interpreted restrictively”.
382
 The court 
quoted Professor Vaver, who explained that “users’ rights are not just loopholes” and 




The court stated that s29 of the Copyright Act requires proof that copyrighted works were 
being used for the purposes of research or private study.
384
 The court then went on to suggest 
that the purpose of research must be given a “large and liberal interpretation in order to 
ensure that user’s rights are not unduly constrained”.
385
 
The court agreed with the Federal Court of Appeal
386
 in that research for purposes of 
“advising clients, giving opinions, arguing cases, preparing briefs and factums” is still 
research.
387
 The court thus concluded that when lawyers are carrying on their business for a 
profit, they conduct research.
388
 
On the question of fairness, the court stated that fairness depends on the facts of the case at 
all times.
389
The court referred to Lord Denning in Hubbard v Vosper
390
 where fairness was 
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said to be a “question of degree”
391
. In this case, the issue was whether the defendant 
(Vosper) had infringed upon the plaintiff’s (Hubbard) copyright by relying on Hubbard’s 
book to produce his work. 
In the Court of Appeal, Linden JA set out a list of factors to assist in determining whether 
dealing is fair.
392
 These factors were drawn from a combination of the principles from 
Hubbard and the doctrine of fair use in the USA. The factors to be considered were 
recommended as follows: 
1) The purpose of the dealing 
2) The character of the dealing 
3) The amount of the dealing  
4) Alternatives to the dealing 
5) The nature of the work and the effect of the dealing on the work.393 
With regards to the first factor the court pointed out that in Canada, a work can only be fair if 
it first fits into any one or more of the listed purposes of fair dealing (research, private study, 
criticism, review or news reporting).
394
 The court stated that to avoid giving the listed 
purposes a restrictive interpretation, “courts should attempt to make an objective assessment 
of the user or defendant’s real purpose or motive in using the copyrighted work”.
395
 
Court concluded that the photocopying service of the Law Society is an acceptable purpose 
under s29 of the Copyright Act.
396
 The court was of the view that the dealings were fair in 
consideration of the factors determining fairness.
397
 
5.3.3.3 CanWest MediaWorks Publications Inc. v Horizons Publications Ltd  
This case is a departure from the reasoning in CCH. As discussed above, CCH did not deal 
with parody but it dealt with how fair dealing should be interpreted. The Supreme Court in 
CCH stated that fair dealing was a user’s right and therefore it had to be interpreted liberally 
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in order to give effect to the user’s interest. This reasoning, although made in a case where 
the purpose of research was at issue, was therefore not specifically limited to such a purpose. 
The court in CanWest did not adhere to the suggestions of the CCH decision; instead the 
judge followed the reasoning of the court in Michelin. 
The plaintiff (Canwest Mediaworks Publications) claimed that the defendant (Horizon 
Publications) had, inter alia, breached their copyright because they had authored, printed and 
distributed an alleged parody of the “Vancouver Sun” on the 7
th
 of June 2007.
398
The 
defendant invoked the defence of parody to this claim. However, when assessing the 
defendant’s claim of parody, the court stated that “Teitelbaum J held clearly in Michelin at 
para 63 that parody is not an exception to copyright infringement under the Copyright Act, 
and therefore does not constitute a defence”.
399
 
5.3.4 Concluding remarks regarding the cases 
The Canadian courts have consistently held that parody is not exempt as fair use. However a 
decision that caused much excitement was that of CCH. Here, although the court did not 
make direct references to parody, the decision of the court was wide enough to be interpreted 
as making changes for parodists.
400
 In CCH the court stated that the defence of fair dealing 
should be interpreted liberally, thus leading some academics such as Craig, to view the 
Canadian Copyright Act of 1985 as being ‘restrictive”.
401
 Furthermore the inconsistency 
between the way the statute is written and the interpretation that was proposed by the CCH 
case has caused scholars to commend the reliance on litigation.
402
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According to Spies although the new Canadian Copyright Act has not defined the meanings 
of parody and satire, the courts are likely to give the terms broad meanings in line with the 








6. LESSONS TO BE LEARNT FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
 South African copyright law currently regulates fair dealing in s12.
404
 In South Africa, fair 
dealing is only allowed for the following purposes: research or private study, personal or 
private use; criticism or review and reporting. As can be seen from this and as it has been 
pointed out on a number of occasions above, this is similar to the approach in the UK and 
Canada. Although it has been argued that the aim of the fair use doctrine in American law is 
the same as the South African fair dealing provision and in this regard Dean notes that the 
two terms ‘fair use’ and ‘fair dealing’ are “synonymous”.
405
 However, as discussed above, 
the concepts of fair dealing in the USA Copyright Act differs from fair dealing in the UK, 
Canadian and South African Copyright Acts in that the USA Copyright Act lists four criteria 
for assessing what is fair use (this is an open-ended approach) whereas the UK, Canadian and 
South African Copyright Act have specific purposes of fair use (a limited approach). From 
this it can be deduced that a South African parodist will have to bring his or her defence 
within the four corners of the statute and as has been shown in other jurisdictions, this is not 
an easy thing to do.  
If it is accepted that parody has a role to play in society, as I am arguing, then there is a need 
to revisit the defences in section 12 of the South African Copyright Act in order to ensure that 
there is an appropriate defence for the parodist. At present the approaches to parody is similar 
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to that in the UK and in Canada before amendments were made to their laws. These fair 
dealing provisions specify those circumstances in which it will be fair use to make use of a 
work without the permission of the author. Therefore the purposes of fair use are listed 
clearly in the statute. The advantage of such an approach is that users can know upfront 
whether they will be protected by a fair use defence or not, that is if a type of purpose is not 
listed in the statute then that use is not allowed as fair dealing.  However, a study of the cases 
has shown that it is quite difficult then to protect parody because parody is not listed as a 
purpose of fair dealing. An alternative option is to follow the American approach and ensure 
that the defence of fair dealing is not limited to the situations set out in section 12 but is 
rather based on the four principles enunciated by the American courts.  
 The advantage of following the American approach is that the American’s have a fairly open 
ended approach to fair dealing. The courts are required to consider the four factors and then 
decide whether the copyright infringement complained of deserves to be protected or not. 
This means that the courts are free to develop the law without being confined to a strictly 
worded statute.  However, the downside to such an approach is that the artist who creates a 
parodic work can never be sure whether he is going to be found guilty of copyright 
infringement at a later stage. From a legal perspective and from a perspective of the a 
development of the law, such an open-ended approach is desirable however, at the same time 
such an approach is seriously problematic from a parodists perspective because he never 
knows whether he is protected by fair use or not and given the costs involved in litigation, an 
artist may chose not to engage in such artistic works and society is then deprived of a 
powerful form of entertainment. 
 
  It can safely be argued that the status quo regarding section 12 should not remain as it is if 
the rights of the parodists are to be protected.  There are therefore two options. One option 
would be to amend the Copyright Act to make it more open-ended such as is found in the 
USA.  The other is to introduce a specific defence of parody into section 12.   
 
7. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
As pointed out above, it is difficult to remain with the current position because firstly; case 





In light of these factors, we can learn from the American open- ended approach. 
However as pointed out above, this approach is risky because parodists do not really know 
whether they are protected or not, and similarly to fair dealing, fair use may involve large 
costs of litigation. The shortfall in the open-ended approach has therefore led to the 
suggestion that copyright law needs to be amended in order to create a specific defence for 
parody.   
This paper has considered the issue of parody and its importance in society. I have argued 
that there is a place for different forms of parody in society including comic parody.  
However, such parody brings the parodist into conflict with copyright owners. I have also 
argued that there is a need to accommodate both the interests of the parodist and copyright 
owners and that the law as it exists in SA today does not do this.  Therefore, in my view, 
there is a need for the legislature to rethink the defences in section 12 and it is my 
recommendation that a specific defence for parody be introduced and that it is not left to the 
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